The Republic, Communism, and Civic Education…Can a Virtuous Mean Be Found? (With head nodding to Nathan and Jared)

In Republic III, Socrates discusses how a society can best educate its citizens toward the goal of human flourishing.  He argues for a sort of censorship of religious texts and poetry, literature and theater, and finally music, all with the end to develop the best type of human character.  It struck me as remarkable how many of the themes here in the Republic can be found in the writings of Marx and the present day governance of the People’s Republic of China. 

First, Socrates advocates for a kind of naturalized religion, one that is ultimately subservient not to revealed truth but to a philosophical conception of the Good.  On face value, his aims seem noble and good.  He wants to take out any of the religious stories that might foster bad or unwanted character development in the city’s citizens.  But his encroachment on religious freedom is really in the same spirit as Marx in his Communist Manifesto.  Marx argued that religious belief was primary in keeping people in a state of oppression, and in order to flourish, people must rid themselves of this belief. 

Second, there is the censorship of the arts: literature, theater, and music.  Socrates stated purpose is to eliminate those aspects which might lead to licentiousness and immoral or corrupt behavior.  But at what cost?  Socrates seems to set up the problem so that one must choose between human flourishing and freedom. 

As I reflect on this, I wonder if Socrates is right.  His concept of imitation, and the passing down of values from one generation to another, I found particularly intriguing.   We imitate those we look up to, and receive much of our character training at a young age from the previous generation.  If we are to teach young people how to be good and develop noble character, must we not discriminate on their behalf in the kind of things they see, hear, and learn?  Should we not limit what they are exposed to?  If I want a child to appreciate the true value and beauty of sexual pleasure between a man and a woman (nodding here to Nathan) in the context of love and a committed lifelong relationship, it seems right that I should censor exposure to pornography.  Maybe this makes me old fashioned.  As one looks around at the degradation of American culture, with kids running around looking like gothic frieks, listening to wretched and hateful music, and getting educated on sexual pleasure from books like 50 Shades of Grey, one wants to exclaim “No wonder!”  Was Socrates right?  Is this is a byproduct of our societies lack of censorship and control over the direction of our cultural development through civic education? 

As an American, proud and free, my first inclination to censorship is strongly negative emotional reaction (nodding here to Jared).  And I think there is something right about that reaction.  On the other hand, as a Christian, I recognize the natural inclination of man to wonder away from the Good. (For those interested, I have in mind Romans 1:21-27.  It’s worth a re-read if you haven’t read it in a while).  God himself set up strict laws for the covenant people of Israel, which included severe limitations on personal freedoms.  So, my question to my fellow classmates who are more learned in virtue theory than myself: Is there a kind of mean between freedom and censorship in the context of civic education?  If so, how do we find it?

The Frustrated Interlocutor - Republic Book 1

Socrates is notorious for frustrating some of his interlocutors to their wits end.  In reading Republic Book I felt as if I were “participating in the Form” of the Socratic Interlocutor.  

In Book I, we find Thrasymachus debating with Socrates about the nature of Justice.  Before he even jumps into the conversation, he knows it is going to be a frustrating experience, calling Socrates out on his incessant questioning, his never offering a proper answer of his own, and even calling him a false witness. The conversation begins, and we find Thrasymachus  giving a very “proto-Nietzschian” view of justice – that justice is essentially the will of the powerful over those who are weaker.  Right away this grabbed me, as I have often been fascinated with Nietzsche’s arguments against morality and his conception of the Superman.  To see these ideas already here in Book I of the Republic once again confirmed Whitehead’s famous quote, that most of Western philosophy is just footnotes to Plato!  The discussion starts out on a political conception of justice, and Thrasymachus  and Socrates debate what it is to be a just ruler.  While this was interesting, what really gripped me was Thrasymachus ’ speech in 343b – 344c, where he gives multiple examples of how the unjust seem to prosper over the just.  His examples include the spheres of contracts (i.e. business), paying taxes, and holding public office, and I felt his arguments and examples in each sphere were quite convincing.  It reminded me of how in many places in Scripture the Biblical author will cry out, wondering why it is that the wicked prosper?  It often does seem that the wicked, i.e. unjust, have a better life.  When Thrasymachus  threatens to stop the conversation short, Socrates pleads with him to continue, saying, “Do you think it a small matter to determine which whole way of life would make living most worthwhile for each of us?”

Yes indeed!  These are the great questions of philosophy!  The ones that really matter. And so I read on with anticipation, eager to see what nuggets of truth that Socrates, the ancient man of wisdom, would bring to the discussion.  

I was greatly disappointed with what followed.  In fact, Socrates’ argument in response was so bad, I was left wondering if it was even serious, or if there was some kind of irony or literary twist that going was going on - perhaps I just was not smart enough to see it?  Socrates creates this convoluted argument, where he explores whether or not the just man wants to outdo the unjust, and vice versa.  We find that the unjust person wants to outdo both the unjust and the just, whereas the just person only wants to outdo the just.  Then Socrates brings up the case of the musician and the physician, who do not want to outdo other musicians and physicians, but only those who are non-musical and do not practice medicine.  He then makes a parallel claim that the knowledgeable person and good person would not want to outdo other knowledgeable or good people but only those who are ignorant or bad.  Socrates concludes that this makes the just person then like the knowledgeable and good person, and the unjust person like the ignorant and the bad.  The argument is frustrating for a number of reasons.  First, it seems to completely miss the point. Thrasymachus was talking about how the unjust seem to have an unfair advantage in the accumulation of wealth, possessions, power and pleasure in the material world.  Socrates simply didn't address any of these issues.  What on earth does Thrasymachus' thesis have to do with whether or not one expert in a field, whether doctor or musician, tries to outdo other experts?  Also, common sense experience seems to indicate that people who possess a craft do in fact try to outdo one other.  In fact, the sense of competition between individuals to outdo one another, while perhaps not a sufficient cause, is surely a what spurs on much of human advancement.  Whether that advancement is better philosophical argumentation, more publications, better products that meet consumer needs, or other kinds of scientific achievement.  The "pride of excellence" one might call this, where one seeks to be the best in their field, while possibly in part for altruistic purposes, but at least in part just to “be the best.”

I feel as mystified and perplexed as Socrates interlocutors often seem to be.  If there is a Greek word for “bedazzled”, I would like to know what it is.

The Apology

Apology

In the dialogue of the Apology, I see the narrative of Socrates and his relation to the god proceeding in three phases.  In Phase I, Socrates’ god-relation begins when his friend Chaerephon (21a) inquires of the oracle at Delphi whether or not anyone is wiser (than Socrates).  When the oracle responds no, Socrates is quite perplexed.  Having a strong sense of his own ignorance, he is unable to understand what the oracle means, and he sets out to solve the riddle by systematically examining the politicians, poets, and craftsmen. There are number of fascinating things going on here.  First, I find it quite interesting that Socrates believes a message from the oracle, although he heard it secondhand.  This demonstrates a kind of piety that is already present in Socrates even prior to hearing this word from the god.  Socrates reminds me of David in 1 Samuel 30, who inquires of the ephod (the high priest), and unlike Paul, he mustn't be struck down with blindness and hear a voice from heaven.  Socrates, the most notorious of questioners, doesn't respond with skepticism, or attempt to question or explain the oracle away because of its improbability. Rather, he assumes the oracle “does not lie” (21b), and that he must seek the truth in the matter.  There is a faith Socrates holds already in the face of reason.  Although there is a strand of defiance, as he sets out to prove the oracle wrong, Socrates is nonetheless operating under a certain kind of proto-faith in his response. 

In Phase II, Socrates’ relation to the god undergoes a kind of transformative moment (or should we call it a conversion moment?) where he comes to a self understanding of what he believes to be the oracle’s message (see 23a-b).  Here Socrates interprets the oracle as saying that “human wisdom is worth little or nothing” – i.e the wisdom of the sophists, how to gain power, wealth, etc (See also, 29e) – and that because Socrates realizes this kind of wisdom is worthless, it makes him wisest of all.  Although he does not describe it in detail, this new interpretation of the oracle makes Socrates believe that the god has called him to the life of philosophy (28e) in order to “examine others” and “reproach those who attach little importance to the most important things” (30).  It would be hard not to describe this as a kind of religious self-understanding, as Socrates is willing to subjugate everything else –even living in poverty and neglecting his sons – in order to fulfill what he believes is his calling.

In Phase III, the narrative progresses further, where I would argue that Socrates portrays himself as prophet.  Socrates says that the god has ‘attached’ him to the city of Athens as a kind of gadfly (SK scholars might make a connection to Kierkegaard’s own self understanding as a gadfly here!).  Although Socrates questions individuals, his vocation has become similar to a prophet, as he is responsible for proclaiming a message of virtue for the people of the city (31b-c).  In 39c, after he is sentenced to death, he makes an official prophesy, that vengeance will come upon those who killed him (for those interested, see David’s prophesy at the end of his life in 2 Samuel 23), and ultimately his death is cast in the light of a martyr’s death.  He was killed for speaking a call to the virtuous life into a people that did not want to hear it.

In Cooper’s introduction to the Apology, he seems to question the sincerity of “Plato’s Socrates in claiming a pious motivation for his philosophical work.”  If Socrates relation to the God is at all accurately captured by what I describe, I don’t see don’t see the evidence that supports his suspicion of Plato’s piety. 

New to the blogosphere

This is my very first blog post...ever. I feel ancient as Socrates.  Thanks to Dr. Anne-Marie Schultz for bringing me out of the dark ages.